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This response offers a critical appraisal of the claim of Albrecht Ritschl to have found 
a possible resolution to what he calls the Anglo-German industrial productivity 
puzzle, which arose as the result of a new industrial production index produced in an 
earlier paper by the same author.1 Projection back from a widely accepted 1935/36 
benchmark using the Ritschl index showed German industrial labour productivity in 
1907 substantially higher than in Britain. This presented a puzzle for at least two 
reasons. First, other comparative information from the pre-World War I period, such 
as wages, seems difficult to square with much higher German labour productivity at 
this time.2 Second, a direct benchmark estimate produced by Stephen Broadberry and 
Carsten Burhop, using production census information for Britain and industrial survey 
material of similar quality for Germany, suggested broadly equal labour productivity 
in 1907.3 Broadberry and Burhop also showed that if Walther Hoffmann’s industrial 
output index was used instead of the Ritschl index for Germany, the puzzle largely 
disappeared.4
 
Ritschl now proposes some further changes to the German industrial output 
index, which move it closer to the Hoffmann index.5 However, to remove the 
remaining discrepancy, Ritschl proposes a number of amendments to the 1907 
benchmark.6 In this reply, we argue that most of the proposed changes to the 
benchmark are unwarranted. We also show that applying a uniform weighting scheme 
to the branch output series used in the new Ritschl industrial production index 
removes most of the remaining discrepancy.  
 
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE 1907 BENCHMARK 
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The first basic difference between the Broadberry and Burhop and Ritschl 
benchmarks concerns our preference for the German industrial survey sources 
wherever possible.7 This is important because it means that we can be sure that the 
output and employment refer to the same production units. In our view, it is not worth 
sacrificing this advantage to obtain data for 1907 rather than 1908 or some other 
alleged benefit of an alternative source of employment data. Furthermore, if anything, 
this reliance on the German industrial surveys is likely to bias our benchmark in 
favour of Germany, since these surveys excluded the craft sector and most small 
firms, where productivity was lower than in the large industrial firms.  
 
To ensure consistency of sources for output and employment, we used data for 
1908 and 1910 for some German industries. Ritschl argues that this biases our results 
against Germany on the grounds that these industries went into recession after 1907.8 
Yet it is clear from Hoffmann’s data on both output and employment that labour 
productivity continued to increase after 1907, so that our use of later years for 
Germany must bias the benchmark in favour of Germany.9 Ritschl’s cyclical 
adjustment nevertheless somehow raises the German productivity lead from 5 per cent 
to 12 per cent, or about one-third of his total proposed adjustment.10 This is wholly 
inappropriate, and any adjustment would have to be in the opposite direction. 
 
Ritschl draws attention to the issue of multi-product firms, and asserts that this 
leads us to overstate employment in Germany because not all workers were producing 
the final product.11 However, the direction of the bias is unclear. If workers were 
allocated to the industry in which they were mainly engaged, then for any particular 
industry there would be both included workers who were not producing wholly for 
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that industry (hence leading to an understatement of productivity) and output 
produced by workers who were allocated to other industries (hence leading to an 
overstatement of productivity). And for industry as a whole, any increase in 
productivity in one branch must surely be offset by a decrease in another branch, 
since the net effect of reallocating labour across multi-product firms must be zero. 
This spurious adjustment adds another 8 percentage points to the German productivity 
advantage. 
 
Ritschl also proposes an adjustment to take account of the smaller cut-off-
point in the size of firms in the German occupation census.12 This adds another 8 
percentage points to the German productivity lead, which is completely out of line 
with similar adjustments for other comparisons, including that of Rainer Fremdling, 
Herman de Jong and Marcel Timmer for the 1935/36 Anglo-German benchmark.13 
But, more importantly, the adjustment is totally unwarranted, since we relied mainly 
on the industrial surveys, which had a higher cut-off point than the British production 
census. If anything, the adjustment should be in the other direction, but in any case 
much, much smaller.  
 
 Nevertheless, Ritschl does provide a useful critical survey of our estimates for 
particular industries, and we have taken on board some of his suggestions.14 As a 
result, we provide an updated version of our 1907 benchmark in Table 1, together 
with our original estimates and Ritschl’s proposed revisions. The changes which we 
have made in response to Ritschl’s critical evaluation are limited to four industries, 
cotton, cement, salt mining and iron ore mining, and details are provided in the longer 
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version of this paper.15 The overall effect is to raise the Germany/UK labour 
productivity lead in 1907 from 5 per cent in our original study to 8.4 percent.  
 
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE GERMAN PRODUCTION INDEX 
Ritschl is critical of Hoffmann’s treatment of the metal processing industry, where 
output is measured by labour income and the assumption of a constant labour income 
share.16 Instead, Ritschl uses volume series for mechanical engineering, electrical 
engineering, motor vehicles and shipbuilding.17 Here, we accept the use of Ritschl’s 
volume series, but impose a uniform weighting scheme.  
 
 The starting point for the weighting scheme is Hoffmann, where the weights 
for each industrial branch are calculated as the product of the value added per 
employee of this branch in 1936 and its employment in 1907 (weights for the years 
1896-1925) and 1933 (weights for the years 1925-1959), respectively.18 However, 
Hoffmann’s original weighting scheme is modified to incorporate Fremdling et al.’s 
corrections to value added per employee in 1936 (as a result of distortions arising 
from war planning) and Fremdling’s corrections to labour force estimates between 
1925 and 1939 (as a result of confusion over boundary changes).19 In addition, we 
apply the same weighting scheme used for the industrial sector as a whole to the 
aggregation within metal processing. This is in contrast to Ritschl, who first combines 
output of the mechanical and electrical engineering industries using gross output in 
1913 as weights and then combines the resulting index for mechanical and electrical 
engineering with the sub-indices for motor vehicle production and shipbuilding using 
1928 weights.20
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With 1913=100, our new index of metal processing output takes a value of 
95.9 in 1925 compared with Hoffmann’s index value of 1925 = 131.4.21 On the other 
hand, the new index is somewhat higher than Ritschl’s index, which had a level of 
1925 = 84.4.22 We then incorporate this new index for the metal processing industry 
into a new index for manufacturing output in Germany for the period 1895-1938 
using the same weighting scheme. Our recalculation of manufacturing output 
confirms qualitatively one of Ritschl’s central results, that manufacturing/industrial 
output was lower during the interwar period than suggested by Hoffmann’s figures. 
According to the new index, by 1936 output was nearly 13 per cent lower than 
Hoffmann believed. However, this does not translate into a 13 per cent effect on 
labour productivity, because the new output weights are derived from changes to the 
employment data. This, in turn, has implications for the main focus of this paper, the 
comparative Germany/UK manufacturing labour productivity level. The results are 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Starting from the widely accepted Germany/UK comparative labour 
productivity level in manufacturing of 102 in 1936, the new time series projection for 
1907 of 112.5 is quite close to our revised 1907 benchmark estimate of comparative 
manufacturing labour productivity of 108.4. What happens here is that over the long 
period 1907 to 1936, Hoffmann’s over-estimation of output growth is partly cancelled 
out by his over-estimation of employment growth, so that the long run comparative 
labour productivity picture is much as suggested by Broadberry.23
 
CONCLUSION 
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In this paper, we reaffirm the central claim of Broadberry and Burhop that 
manufacturing labour productivity was broadly equal in Britain and Germany during 
the first half of the twentieth century.24 We first reject Ritschl’s attempt to revise our 
1907 benchmark substantially upwards.25 We then show that applying a uniform 
weighting scheme to Ritschl’s new output series for metal processing removes most 
of any remaining inconsistency between time series projections and benchmarks.  
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TABLE 1: Comparative Germany/U.K. labor productivity circa 1907 (UK =100) 
 
 Original 
Broadberry-
Burhop 
Ritschl  Revised 
Broadberry-
Burhop
General chemicals 126.6 134.3 126.6
Coke 98.9 123.5 98.9
CHEMICALS & ALLIED 113.9 130.5 113.9
Iron & steel 137.8 144.0 137.8
Non-ferrous metals 157.9 221.5 157.9
Motor vehicles 89.7 135.2 89.7
METALS & ENGINEERING 139.2 152.1 139.2
Cotton 85.6 128.4 87.3
Silk 74.9 93.7 74.9
Leather 67.8 100.8 67.8
TEXTILES & CLOTHING 82.3 121.7 83.6
Brewing 90.5 102.7 90.5
Tobacco 28.3 38.4 28.3
Sugar 47.3 47.3 47.3
FOOD, DRINK & TOBACCO 66.9 73.0 66.9
Cement 108.1 124.2 124.1
OTHER MANUFACTURING 108.1 124.1
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 105.0 128.0 108.4
 
Salt mining 57.8 130.1 106.8
Coal mining 78.5 95.5 78.5
Iron ore mining 91.0 129.8 77.0
MINING 78.7 97.9 77.7
TOTAL INDUSTRY 101.8 124.5 104.7
 
Sources: Broadberry and Burhop, “Comparative Productivity”, p. 321 and Ritschl 
“Anglo-German”, Table 7. 
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TABLE 2: Projections of Germany/UK comparative labour productivity in 
manufacturing 
 
 1907 1925 1933 1936
UK index of manufacturing output (1913=100) 88.8 111.8 119.6 155.7
UK index of manufacturing employment 
(1913=100) 
93.0 93.4 89.4 101.1
UK index of manufacturing labour productivity 
(1936=100) 
62.0 77.7 86.9 100.0
German index of manufacturing output (1913=100) 76.6 96.1 78.6 121.4
German index of manufacturing employment 
(1913=100) 
92.6 111.8 77.6 100.5
German index of manufacturing labour productivity 
(1936=100) 
68.4 71.1 83.8 100.0
Comparative Germany/UK manufacturing labour 
productivity (UK=100) 
112.5 93.4 98.5 102.0
 
Sources: UK output and employment indices from Broadberry, Productivity Race, pp. 
43-44. German output index: own calculation, see text. German employment own 
calculations using data from Hoffmann, Das Wachstum, p. 196 for 1907 and 
Fremdling, “German Industrial Employment”, p. 178 for 1925, 1933 and 1936. 
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